We consider the problem of outsourced computation that operates on encrypted inputs supplied by multiple independent parties. To facilitate fine-grained access control, it would be desirable if each party could encrypt her input under an appropriate access policy. Moreover, a party should only be authorized to decrypt the result of a computation performed on a set of encrypted inputs if his credentials satisfy the composition of all input policies. There has been limited success so far achieving homomorphic encryption in the functional setting; that is, for primitives such as Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) and Identity Based Encryption (IBE). We introduce a new primitive that captures homomorphic encryption with support for access policies and policy composition. We then present a generic construction using CP-ABE and multikey Fully-Homomorphic encryption (FHE). Furthermore, we show that a CP-ABE scheme that is homomorphic for circuits of polylogarithmic depth in some parameter m implies a CP-ABE scheme that is homomorphic for circuits of arity m and unbounded depth.
INTRODUCTION
With the advent of cloud computing, there is a rapidly expanding interest in using remote data centers to perform large computational tasks. Many organizations do not have the computational resources to perform such tasks and the low cost,scalable and highly available model offered by remote providers present an attractive option to organizations. A significant downside of delegating computing jobs to the cloud is the risk of exposure of the delegator's sensitive data. Indeed, sending such data in an unencrypted form may be strictly prohibited by government and industry policies. A number of cryptographic primitives have been proposed to preserve privacy in computing tasks carried out by untrusted or semi-trusted parties. A well-known example is fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE), which was first realized in 2009 by Gentry (Gentry, 2009) . FHE allows us to outsource a computation to a cloud provider in such a way that the cloud provider can carry out the computation without being able to see the inputs and outputs. Gentry's construction is public-key and thus allows public delegatability insofar as the sender(s) of inputs to the * The author's work is funded by the Irish Research Council EMBARK Initiative. cloud need not have access to the secret key needed to decrypt the result. Therefore, multiple encryptors may independently contribute data that is to be (potentially) incorporated into a large remote computation.
The Problem Domain
In standard public-key FHE, there is only a single target recipient. This may be ill-suited to the needs of a large organization. Consider a scenario where staff have restricted access to data based on their department and position. The organization has opted to avail of the computational resources of a cloud provider for the purpose of delegating sizeable computational tasks. Each sender of data acts independently since they are potentially unaware of other's participation.
To comply with the organization's privacy regulations, each sender must encrypt her data under an appropriate access policy that specifies the credentials a staff member must have in order to access the data (or any derivative thereof). We assume such an access policy is feasibly determined from the data source and context.
The computation to be performed, and the inputs to be used, may be decided at a later stage by a subset of the senders, or another delegated authority. The results of the computation are then subsequently returned to the organization, and they should only be accessible to a given staff member if her credentials satisfy the cumulative policies associated with all the inputs used.
One solution is to use public-key FHE together with a trusted access control system (ACS), which holds the private key for the FHE scheme. The role of the ACS is to grant users (i.e. staff members in the above scenario) access to a plaintext after verifying that their credentials satisfy the policy set associated with the corresponding ciphertext. Access control of this form facilitates expressive policies. However, it must be used in conjunction with a cryptographic primitive such as a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system as, otherwise, unauthorized users may collude in order to report an incorrect policy.
This approach suffers from a number of drawbacks:
• All parties interested in a result are required to contact the ACS, which must remain online and exhibit high availability in order to guarantee satisfactory responsiveness. The ACS may therefore act as a bottleneck, especially under high load scenarios.
• Adhering to the principle of least privilege, the organization may wish to limit the capabilities of the ACS. In particular, it may have reservations about the ACS being compromised, and potentially providing an attacker access to all results returned from the cloud.
• Remote users, with appropriate valid credentials, cannot directly query the cloud for data and decrypt non-interactively. All requests must be routed via the organization's ACS.
Many of these shortcomings are flexibly addressed through a functional encryption (FE) approach. In the FE setting, a trusted authority (TA) authenticates and authorizes users by issuing them secret keys for certain capabilities. For our purposes, we deal with a special case of FE known as ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) where the capabilities correspond to credentials or attributes. Note that we use the term attribute here to refer to (collectively) what some authors describe as a particular set of attributes. A user with a secret key for an attribute a can decrypt any ciphertext encrypted under a policy satisfied by a. A principal advantage of CP-ABE over an ACS-based solution is that once the user is issued a secret key for a, no further interaction with the TA is required (for a certain period of time i.e. a may be time-limited) throughout which the user can decrypt an arbitrary number of ciphertexts non-interactively. The advantages of ABE in distributed environments have been investigated in other work, such as (Pirretti et al., 2010) . Although CP-ABE has some deficiencies, such as inherent escrow (which the ACS approach suffers from also) and a lack of support for revocation, it is well-suited to achieving fine-grained access control with minimal interaction.
It is not trivial to reconcile the features of FHE and CP-ABE. There are currently no known fullyhomomorphic CP-ABE schemes. Indeed, there are also no fully-homomorphic identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes, which is a weaker primitive than CP-ABE.
Contributions
In this work, we propose a syntax for a more general primitive which seeks to capture the requirements of the problem space described above, while incorporating properties from FHE and CP-ABE. We call this primitive policy-based homomorphic encryption (PBHE). The formulation of PBHE extends the recent definition of multikey FHE by Lopez-Alt, Tromer and Vaikuntanathan (López-Alt et al., 2012) . Central to PBHE is the notion of access policy composition, and we define the syntax and the correctness properties of PBHE in terms of an algebraic structure defined on access policies. PBHE can be instantiated by any homomorphic CP-ABE scheme or any standard homomorphic public-key cryptosystem.
Another contribution of this work is the construction of a new PBHE scheme that supports fullyhomomorphic evaluation of circuits whose input ciphertexts are encrypted under a bounded number of independently-chosen policies. This scheme fulfills the requirements of the scenario outlined above for a bounded number of senders. This bound is polynomial in the security parameter.
Finally, and leveraging the work of (López-Alt et al., 2012), we prove that if a CP-ABE scheme E is homomorphic for a class of circuits of polylogarithmic depth in a parameter m (which is polynomial in the security parameter), then there exists a scheme E ′ that is homomorphic for all circuits with arity m and with arbitrary depth. This is a significant result as obtaining homomorphic CP-ABE for circuits of unbounded depth has been impeded by the fact that there does not seem to be a way to employ bootstrapping in the functional setting (non-interactively) since bootstrapping requires encryptions of the secret key bits to be available as part of the public key. We note that our work in this paper is limited to the semi-honest model. In particular, we assume that the cloud is semi-honest. We leave to future work the challenge of securing against malicious adversaries, especially in verifying that a function was evaluated correctly.
Related Work
Homomorphic encryption in a multi-user setting is considered in (Xiao et al., 2012) . The authors propose a new homomorphic symmetric encryption scheme that is shown to be secure under a factoring assumption, provided an attacker is limited to obtaining a bounded number (polynomial in the security parameter) of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. The authors also propose a system model with mutually untrusted components that enables a master key for their scheme to be derived from any user's key by splitting it into shares that are distributed to each component by a dealer at system initialization time. However, their solution requires interaction with a server known as a key agent for every request/response to/from the cloud. Furthermore, their solution does not support any level of expressive access control. The notion of multikey FHE was recently presented in (López-Alt et al., 2012) along with a concrete construction based on NTRU (Hoffstein et al., 1998) . In that work, multikey FHE is used to construct an "on-the-fly"multi-party computation (MPC) protocol that is secure in the malicious setting. In such an MPC protocol, a number of parties independently send encrypted inputs to an evaluator without interaction. The evaluator then computes a function F over the inputs and sends the encrypted result to each party. It is then possible for the senders to run an interactive MPC protocol to jointly decrypt the result, verify each other's participation, and verify F was honestly computed by the evaluator. While we make use of multikey FHE for our generic construction in Section 5 and as a basis for the syntax of PBHE in Section 4, we address a different problem than (López-Alt et al., 2012) i.e. we do not target MPC wherein each party wishes to keep his input secret. In our protocol, interactive decryption is avoided at the loss of verifiability. Achieving the latter in a meaningful way is a topic for future work.
Additional related work arises in the ABE setting, such as the construction of CP-ABE (Bethencourt et al., 2007) , and in the area of access control facilitating access policy composition (Bonatti et al., 2002; Bruns et al., 2007; Ni et al., 2009 ). More recently (Rao et al., 2011) 's work on policy composition has targeted real-world access control languages like XACML (Moses et al., 2005) . In our context the objects to protect are data, and the policies are not enforced by a server but rather by an encryption scheme, so it is important to note that the scope for policy composition is far more restrictive as it is necessary to preserve semantic security.
Homomorphic encryption in the functional setting was investigated recently in and a group-homomorphic IBE scheme was presented therein. Thus far, the IBE variant of the scheme from (Gentry et al., 2010 ) is the only IBE scheme to the best of our knowledge that can compactly evaluate 2-DNF formulae.
PRELIMINARIES 2.1 Notation
A quantity t is said to be negligible in a parameter κ if it holds that t < 1/ f (κ) for all polynomials f .
If D is a random variable, the notation x $ ← − D denotes the fact that x is sampled according to the distribution on D. If instead that D is a set, then the notation is understood to mean that x is uniformly sampled from D.
Access Policies
An access policy is a predicate that grants or denies permission to access a particular object in some specific manner. Some contexts require rich policies that present multiple outcomes for an access. For example, Bruns, Dantas and Huth (Bruns et al., 2007) represent a policy as a four-valued predicate whose range is {grant, deny, unspecified or conflict}. Access control systems with these requirements typically accommodate many modes of access to an object. In our case, the objects correspond to data, and it is meaningful in this context to either grant or deny (mutually exclusive) access to a datum. Therefore, we naturally represent an access policy as a two-valued predicate.
CP-ABE Syntax
A CP-ABE scheme for a class of access policies F defined over a domain of attributes A with message space M is a tuple of PPT algorithms (Setup, Extract, Enc, Dec). As mentioned in the introduction, we refer to the entity that an access policy is applied to as an attribute instead of a set of attributes as in (Bethencourt et al., 2007 ). An attribute a in a domain A may be viewed as a set of "sub-attributes". Accordingly, we express access policies as predicates i.e. F ⊆ A → {0, 1}. The Trusted Authority (TA) runs Setup to generate the public parameters PP and a master secret key MSK. It runs sk a ← Extract(MSK, a) to derive a secret key for an attribute a ∈ A.
There are two main definitions of semantic security are distinguished by whether the adversary is allowed to make adaptive requests for secret keys. In the non-adaptive (IND-NA-CPA) game, a challenger hands PP to the adversary A who can make queries to an extraction oracle X := Extract(MSK, ·) to obtain secret keys for certain attributes. At the end of this phase, A chooses a target policy f * ∈ F and two mes- A CP-ABE scheme is said to be IND-NA-CPA secure if every PPT adversary A has only a negligible advantage in the above game. In the adaptive variant (IND-AD-CPA), A is also allowed to make queries to X after the challenge ciphertext is generated.
Multikey FHE
Multikey FHE allow multiple independentlygenerated keys to be used together in a homomorphic evaluation. The syntax of multikey FHE imposes a limit N on the number of such keys that can be supported. Furthermore, the size of the evaluated ciphertext does not depend on the size of the circuit (or number of inputs), but instead on the number of independent keys used. In order to decrypt, the parties who have the corresponding secret keys must collaborate in an MPC protocol. Informally, evaluation is only required to be correct if at most N keys are used in MKFHE.Eval; that is, |{vk 1 , . . . , vk ℓ }| ≤ N. Furthermore, the size of an evaluated ciphertext c ⋆ must only depend polynomially on the security parameter κ and the number of keys N, and not on the size of the circuit.
The IND-CPA security game for multikey homomorphic encryption is the same as that for standard public-key encryption; note that the adversary is given the evaluation key vk.
HOMOMORPHIC CP-ABE WITH BOUNDED COMPOSITION
Let F be a set of valid access policies which accept or reject members of a set of attributes A. An access policy f ∈ F is represented as a predicate A → {0, 1}.
Recall that our goal is to facilitate joint computation on encrypted inputs contributed by multiple independent parties, who may be unaware of each other. Moreover, each party has the liberty to encrypt her inputs under an independently-chosen policy. Accordingly, it is necessary to support composition of these policies. Intuitively, one would expect that the result of the joint computation be decryptable by users with an attribute that satisfies the composite policy. Therefore, we introduce a binary composition operation ⊙ defined on F.
We begin by giving a precise definition of homomorphic CP-ABE. A CP-ABE scheme is homomorphic for a class of circuits C if there is an additional algorithm Eval and a composition operation ⊙ : F 2 → F such that over all choices of f 1 , .
for any a ∈ A and sk a ← Extract(MSK, a).
• Compactness
where
The main idea in this paper is to exploit multikey FHE and CP-ABE to construct a new CP-ABE scheme that is homomorphic for a class of circuits C of bounded arity. However, we can only achieve this for certain policy algebras (F, ⊙). Let E ABE be a CP-ABE scheme and let E MKFHE be a multikey FHE scheme. Roughly speaking, to encrypt a message m under policy f in our scheme, (1) a key triple (pk, vk, sk) is generated for E MKFHE ; (2) m is encrypted with E MKFHE under pk; (3) sk is encrypted with E ABE under policy f ; (4) the two previous ciphertexts along with vk constitute the ciphertext that is produced. Therefore, E MKFHE is used for hiding the message and for homomorphic computation whereas E ABE enforces the access policies by appropriately hiding the secret keys for E MKFHE . Technically, it is the number of compositions in our scheme that must be bounded and not the arity of the circuits. However, the former implies the latter due to the syntactic restrictions of homomorphic CP-ABE (See Section 4).
It might seem necessary that ⊙ be both commutative and associative. However, we only require that these properties hold with respect to semantics. We say that two policies f , g ∈ F are semantically equivalent, written f ∼ g, if for all attributes a ∈ A, we have that f (a) = g(a). Formally, it is required that ∼ be a congruence relation with respect to ⊙ and that (F/ ∼, ⊙) be a commutative semigroup. In sum, the properties that ⊙ must satisfy for any f , g, h ∈ F are as follows:
for any a ∈ A.
Note that the last property is necessary for semantic security.
We denote the size of a policy f ∈ F by its length, written | f | ∈ N. For some algebras, the size of policies do not always grow with composition. Consider the following semilattices (commutative idempotent semigroups).
• the Kronecker semilattice where ⊙ is defined as:
and z is a distinguished policy in F with the property that z(a) = 0 ∀a ∈ A.
• the meet semilattice where ⊙ is defined as ∧.
Using our approach as described above, we cannot construct homomorphic CP-ABE for idempotent algebras (F, ⊙) because | f ⊙ f | = | f |, which implies that the compactness condition given by 2 cannot be satisfied since the ciphertexts in our scheme grow with composition. However, we have obtained the following result. Suppose that E ABE is a somewhathomomorphic CP-ABE scheme with a policy algebra (F, ⊙). More precisely, suppose that E ABE is homomorphic for a class of circuits C of depth that is polylogarithmic in the security parameter. Then there exists a CP-ABE scheme for (F, ⊙) that is homomorphic for a class of circuits of arbitrary depth whose arity is bounded by a fixed polynomial in the security parameter. Informally, the theorem gives us a way to trade "breadth" (arity) for depth. The proof is deferred to the extended version (Clear and McGoldrick, 2013) of this work.
POLICY-BASED HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
Our approach is applicable to policy algebras (F, ⊙) where the policy size always grows with composition.
An example of such an algebra is the free semigroup F * on a set F. Moreover, our approach can handle at most N compositions where N is the maximum number of independent users supported by the multikey FHE scheme E MKFHE . Observe that the inputs encrypted by the same user under the same policy need not be composed together with ⊙. Therefore, the scheme can handle more than N inputs, but at most N independent policies. However, the syntax of homomorphic CP-ABE is too limited to capture this exemption. This fact serves to motivate the formulation of a more general primitive which we refer to as policy-based homomorphic encryption (PBHE). Our formulation of PBHE is influenced considerably by the definition of multikey FHE, and inherits many of its properties. For every (PP, MSK) ← Setup(1 κ ), every collection of t ≤ N access policies f 1 , . . . , f t ∈ F, and every collection of key-pairs [ℓ] and all attributes a ∈ A and secret keys sk a ← Extract (MSK, a) , and all circuits C ∈ C, the following properties are satisfied for every c ′ = Eval (C, (c 1 , vk v 1 
• Correctness:
Informally, the first correctness condition requires that evaluation keys be uniquely associated with an access policy. Besides including information necessary for evaluation, which could instead be embedded in the ciphertext, the main role of an evaluation key is to allow ciphertexts produced by the same encryptor to be grouped together into classes. The composition operation is not applied among the members of such classes according to the second correctness condition. In other words, composition is performed on equivalence classes where the equivalence relation is defined by equality of evaluation keys. The motivation for this is to compensate for the non-idempotency of an operation ⊙. For example, it may be the case that the ciphertexts produced by the same encryptor share information that can be exploited to assist homomorphic computation among them. This is exemplified by multikey FHE.
Security.
The semantic security definition for PBHE is similar to that of CP-ABE. We also refer to this as IND-AD-CPA security. In fact, the security game is the same as that for CP-ABE except that the adversary is also given (ek, vk) ← PBHE.GenKey(PP, f ⋆ ) after it chooses a target policy f ⋆ . There is a subtlety with respect to the ciphertexts outputted by the evaluation algorithm, namely ensuring that a user can decrypt such ciphertexts if and only if they have a secret key for an attribute that satisfies the composite policy. This is explored further in the extended version.
CONSTRUCTION OF PBHE
In this section, we construct a new generic PBHE scheme that can be instantiated by an IND-AD-CPA secure CP-ABE scheme together with any IND-CPA secure multikey FHE scheme.
Remark.
Concrete constructions of CP-ABE and multi-key FHE already exist which fulfill the properties we need. Examples of the former include (Bethencourt et al., 2007; Waters, 2011) and an example of the latter is the NTRU-based construction from (López-Alt et al., 2012) .
Let E ABE = (ABE.Setup, ABE.Extract, ABE.Enc, ABE.Dec) be a CP-ABE scheme for a class of policies F ABE , a set of attributes A ABE and a message space M ABE .
Let {E (N) MKFHE = (MKFHE.Gen, MKFHE.Enc, MKFHE.Dec, MKFHE.Eval)} N>0 be a family of multikey fullyhomomorphic encryption schemes. In our generic PBHE scheme, the set of attributes A is defined as A A ABE . Now we need to define an algebraic structure of access policies (F, ⊙) that obeys the three properties given by 3, 4 and 5.
Supported Access Policies and Composition
Define a subset F ⊆ F ABE that is closed under ∧. We define (F, ⊙) as the free semigroup F * on F i.e. the set of finite strings composed of elements of F. For brevity, we will use juxtaposition instead of explicitly writing ⊙ when representing policies in F. The semantic interpretation of a policy f 1 . . . f ℓ ∈ F is such that the following holds
Moreover, the size | f | of a policy f = f 1 . . . f ℓ is the sum ∑ ℓ i=1 |f i |. This is to be distinguished from the length of a policy in f ∈ F, written λ( f ), which is the length of the corresponding string of elements from F.
Note that any policy f ∈ F can be transformed into a semantically equivalent policy f ′ with λ( f ′ ) = 1. Thus, we assume without loss of generality that this is what the GenKey algorithm takes as input.
Key Trees
Now we show how our PBHE scheme enforces access policies in F and how it handles composition. By abuse of notation, we write ABE.Enc(PP, f , M) for M / ∈ M ABE to signify the encryption of multiple elements of M ABE in order to "cover" M. The analogous notion is also assumed for decryption.
Let f be a policy in F. Our approach involves mapping f to a binary tree τ f (which we call a key tree) whose nodes are associated with ciphertexts in the CP-ABE scheme. Each leaf node corresponds to an element of F while an interior node corresponds to the conjunction of its left and right branches. More precisely, the leaf nodes are encryptions of the secret keys for E MKFHE XORed with a random blinding string. An interior node encrypts the concatenation of the blinding strings of its child nodes XORed with a new blinding string. Thus, in order to access the secret keys at the leaves, it is necessary to decrypt from the root down. Thus, if a user's attribute satisfies the root policy, she can decrypt every layer and eventually recover the secret keys hidden by the ciphertexts at the leaves. Indeed, satisfying the root policy is a sufficient and necessary condition to recover any secret key.
A key tree τ f for a policy f := f 1 . . . f ℓ consists of a list of CP-ABE ciphertexts [ψ i ] i≤2ℓ−1 . We associate with each leaf node in τ f a unique key tuple (pk, sk, vk) ← MKFHE.Gen(1 κ ) in the multikey FHE scheme. Roughly speaking, we set the leaf node of τ f to an encryption of sk ⊕ r under f in the CP-ABE scheme where r is a random string of length |sk|. Every tree is associated with such a random value, and thus for convenience, we will sometimes refer to a pair (r, [ψ 1 ] i≤2 h+1 −1 ) as a "tree". Now to construct a key tree for a policy f , consider an algorithm MkTree ⋆ which proceeds as follows:
1. On input f ∈ F, decompose f into f 1 . . . f k .
For 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
(a) Set (pk i , sk i , vk i ) ← MKFHE.Gen(1 κ ). (pk 1 , vk 1 ), . . . , (pk k , vk k ) ).
where Combine is defined below.
Note that we denote by MkTree the variant of MkTree ⋆ that outputs only the first component of the tuple outputted by MkTree ⋆ , namely the tree τ 1 . To combine two trees τ f := (r, [χ i ] i≤2ℓ 1 −1 ) and τ g := (s, [ψ i ] i≤2ℓ 2 −1 ) for policies f := f 1 . . . f ℓ 1 (g := g 1 . . . g ℓ 2 resp.), the following algorithm is used (we refer to this algorithm as Combine): Decrypting a tree with a secret key sk a for an attribute a ∈ A is defined recursively:
where π = ABE.Dec(sk a , ω).
• Therefore, DecTree produces a list of secret keys for E MKFHE , which may be empty if the attribute does not satisfy the associated policy.
Construction
For brevity, we will assume that all policies f passed as input to GenKey satisfy λ( f ) = 1. Our PBHE scheme E PBHE is defined as follows:
• Setup(1 κ ): Given a security parameter κ, generate (PP, MSK) ← ABE.Setup(1 κ ). Output (PP, MSK).
• Extract(MSK, a): Given a master secret key MSK and an attribute a ∈ A, output sk a ← ABE.Extract(MSK, a).
